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Abstract
In decision-making on the politically-contentious issue of unconventional gas development, the UK
Government and European Commission are attempting to learn from the US experience. Although
economic, environmental, and health impacts and regulatory contexts have been compared
cross-nationally, public perceptions and their antecedents have not. We conducted similar online
panel surveys of national samples of UK and US residents simultaneously in September 2014 to
compare public perceptions and beliefs affecting such perceptions. The US sample was more likely to
associate positive impacts with development (i.e. production of clean energy, cheap energy, and
advancing national energy security). The UK sample was more likely to associate negative impacts
(i.e. water contamination, higher carbon emissions, and earthquakes). Multivariate analyses reveal
divergence cross-nationally in the relationship between beliefs about impacts and support/
opposition—especially for beliefs about energy security. People who associated shale gas development
with increased energy security in the UK were over three times more likely to support development
than people in the US with this same belief. We conclude with implications for policy and
communication, discussing communication approaches that could be successful cross-nationally and
policy foci to which the UK might need to afford more attention in its continually evolving regulatory
environment.
1. Introduction
The general public’s framing of unconventional gas
development (UGD), portrayed in mass media, social
media, and documentary film, has influenced politi-
cal regulation of development and the industry’s social
licence to operate (Lloyd et al 2013, Andrews and
McCarthy 2014, Cotton et al 2014, Luke et al 2014,
Simonelli 2014, Vasi et al 2015, Williams et al 2017,
Bomberg 2015, Mazur 2016). The ability of develop-
ment to proceed in the UK and elsewhere will depend
just as much on public perceptions and acceptability
of this form of energy extraction as it does on scien-
tific and technical knowledge (Rayner 2010, Webler
and Tuler 2010, The Royal Society 2012, Kasper-
son and Ram 2013, Stephenson 2016, UKERC 2016).
Nevertheless, while research has focused on the extent
towhich economic, environmental, and health impacts
and local contexts associated with extensive develop-
ment in the US are potentially transferable to the
UK (House of Lords 2014, Public Health England
2014), and Europe broadly (EASAC 2014, Pearson et al
2012), similar attention has not been afforded to public
perceptions (Thomas et al 2017).
© 2017 IOP Publishing Ltd
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We compare public perceptions of UGD (often
called ‘fracking’)7 in the United Kingdom (UK) and
United States (US) via simultaneously-implemented
surveys of representative national samples in both
nations. Each nation has witnessed intense mass media
coverage (Evensen et al 2014a, Jaspal andNerlich 2014,
Jaspal et al 2014, Williams et al 2017, Ashmoore et al
2016, Bomberg 2015, Mazur 2016), policy attention,
and debate on this issue (Small et al 2014, Sovacool
2014, Wiseman 2014, Konschnik and Dayalu 2016).
Both nations have considerable unconventional gas
reserves in which firms have expressed active inter-
est in exploitation. Many differences exist between
the UK and US, however, in: (1) private vs. national
ownership of mineral rights, (2) processes for leas-
ing mineral rights, (3) national vs. state/regional/local
governance, (4) the level at which most political dis-
course occurs, and (5) length and depth of experience
with physical development (see Stedman et al (2016)
for an overview of such differences). Furthermore, the
social and cultural contexts vary considerably across
nations (Partridge et al 2017). The differences in policy
and regulation between the US and Europe on UGD
(Boersma and Johnson 2012, Wang and Hefley 2016,
Whitton et al 2017) and the differential influence of
communication on policy across these regions (Metze
and Dodge 2016, Bomberg 2017, Dodge and Metze
2017) have been a topic of notable academic interest.
Far less research has compared public perspectives on
UGD.
Public perceptions on this issue have been stud-
ied extensively in the US (e.g. Anderson and Theodori
2009, Braiser et al 2011, Perry 2012, Jacquet and Sted-
man 2013, Kriesky et al 2013, Ladd 2013, Theodori
2013, Jacquet and Stedman 2014, Theodori et al 2014,
Clarke et al 2015, Crowe et al 2015, Evensen 2015,
Evensen et al 2017, Israel et al 2015, Morrone et al
2015, Schafft and Biddle 2015, Sangaramoorthy et al
2016, Kroepsch 2016, see Thomas et al 2017 for a
review) and UK individually (e.g. Cotton et al 2014,
Cotton 2015, Whitmarsh et al 2015, Williams et al
2017, Bomberg 2015, Andersson-Hudson et al 2016,
O’Hara et al 2016, see Lis et al 2015 for a review),
but to our knowledge there has been no cross-national
quantitative comparison of factors influencing per-
ceptions. One study has compared perceptions across
in-depth qualitative workshops in select cities within
the UK and California (Partridge et al 2017). Other
research compared perceptions across in-depth indi-
vidual interviews: (1) in the US and Canada (Evensen
and Stedman 2017a) and (2) nations in Eastern Europe
7 We use the term ‘unconventional gas development’ throughout
this article to refer to the set of processes and associated effects
that attend this form of energy extraction/development. While no
term is perfect, social-psychological research into how this word is
used provides nuanced discussions of why to avoid use of ‘fracking’
(Wolske and Hoffman 2013, Evensen et al 2014b, Evensen 2016).
We employ this term to mean the processes most commonly linked
to ‘shale gas’ and ‘fracking’ in public and mass media discourse.
(Goldthau and LaBelle 2016, Goldthau and Sovacool
2016). Furthermore, we previously reported on differ-
ent data from the same comparative surveys examined
herein to explore the relationship between awareness
of UGD and support for development cross-nationally
(Stedman et al 2016). In this article, we substantially
further understanding of cross-national differences by
examining UK versus US differences in associations
between beliefs about impacts caused byUGDand sup-
port for UGD. This new analysis allows us to consider
why cross-national variations exist; we then use this
information to recommend how political communica-
tion and policy approaches in each nation couldmirror
or depart from those in the other nation.
1.1. Research questions
Thedifferences between theUKandUSand the interest
in identifying lessons fromtheUSexperiencewithUGD
that could apply in the UK, led us to the following
research questions that guided our data collection and
analysis:
1. What differences, if any, exist between the UK and
US on beliefs about impacts associated with UGD?
2. Are cross-national differences in support and oppo-
sition unique to UGD or are they also reflected in
support for and opposition to other energy sources?
3. What factors (e.g. beliefs and/or demographic char-
acteristics) exert the greatest influence on support
for and opposition toUGD in each nation?Do these
factors, or the strength of their relationship with
support and opposition, differ cross-nationally?
2. Methods
We used an existing, repeated cross-sectional online
survey of the UK general public to conduct a UK/US
comparison of public perceptions. We implemented
nearly identical surveys with the UK sample (7–9
September 2014, n= 3823, administered by YouGov)
and US sample (16–19 September 2014, n= 1625,
administeredbyQualtrics).Both surveys approximated
their respective national populations with respect to
sex, regional distribution (by state in the US and by
the 12 national census regions in the UK), and age
(of individuals 18 years and older)8. Because both sur-
vey firms draw respondents from online panels, quotas
were applied to responses to ensure that the resulting
responses match the national averages demographi-
cally. In addition to the aforementioned metrics on
8 The US sample oversampled residents from PA (n= 254) and NY
(n= 262) to allow for cross state comparisons of these two states in the
Marcellus Shale region with different regulatory climates on UGD.
For all analysis in this article, unless specified otherwise, we applied
proportional weights to the NY and PA sub-samples to constrain
these to represent the proportions of the national population from
NY and PA.
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* independent samples t-test between nations significant at p < 0.01; ** significant at p < 0.001.  T-test excludes ‘don’t know’ responses from 
the analysis. 
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Figure 1. Do you associate the following with shale gas?
which the samples were representative, the YouGov
sample alsousedquotas for social class (aUKmarketing
research metric) and type of newspaper readership.
While the two surveys employed mostly the same
questions, wording did vary in a few instances (see
supplementary methods available at stacks.iop.org/
ERL/12/124004/mmedia). An additional limitation is
the slightly different recruitment strategies of the online
firms that conducted the research in the respective
nations, although both did employ existing online
panels and used quota sampling approaches. Fur-
thermore, the samples were nationally representative
based on population distribution across the nations,
meaning that areas with low population have very lit-
tle representation in the surveys (e.g. states such as
the Dakotas, Wyoming, and Montana; regions such
as Scotland, Wales, and North East England; and
all rural areas). This means that areas with UGD
(or potential for UGD) contributed few respondents.
The goal, however, was not a cross-state comparison
within the US or a cross-region comparison in the
UK; instead we sought to identify macro-level differ-
ences between the US and UK. The survey should be
viewed as reflecting national views on this topic, not
the views of communities exposed to development
or with potential for development (see Clarke et al
(2016) and Evensen and Stedman (2016) for a dis-
cussion of differences in perception based on scale of
analysis).
The original wording appears in our supplemental
material for each question we report on in the results
section. These were not the only questions in the sur-
vey (for the full survey text also see the supplemental
information). We began the survey with a question
asking respondents to identify which gas, from a list,
is associated with hydraulic fracturing or ‘fracking’. If
they answered correctly (‘shale gas’), they continued on
to the rest of the survey; if they answered incorrectly,
they received a brief statement about shale gas and then
continued.
3. Results
3.1. UK/US differences in support and opposition
In our previous analysis of this data set (Stedman et al
2016), we report on basic descriptive statistics—herein
we focus onmultivariate relationships. The prior analy-
sis revealed that 60% of the US sample replied shale gas
extraction ‘should’ be allowed, whereas 25% answered
‘should not’, and 16% responded ‘don’t know’. In the
UK sample, 44% responded ‘should’, 27% answered
‘should not’, and 29% responded ‘don’t know’. Uncer-
tainty was almost twice as prevalent in the UK as
in the US, despite twice as many people in the UK
answering the awareness question correctly as in the
US (72% versus 36%—which gas, from a list, is asso-
ciated with hydraulic fracturing?). In addition to the
national level analysis on support and opposition, we
compared across areas within each nation (see supple-
mental information for these data).
Below we address each of our research questions in
turn, and in doing so shed light on possible rationales
for cross-national differences in support and opposi-
tion.
3.2. UK/US differences in beliefs about impacts
We asked respondents whether or not they associ-
ated six distinct impacts with shale gas (figure 1; see
also table S1 in supplementary information for the full
data). When excluding ‘don’t know’ answers, a higher
percentage of UK respondents, compared with US
respondents, associated the three negative impacts with
shale gas (i.e. earthquakes, water contamination, and
higher emissions); a higher percentage of US respon-
dents associated the three positive impacts with shale
gas (i.e. cheap energy, clean energy, energy security).
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* independent samples t-test between nations significant at p < 0.01; ** significant at p < 0.001; t-test compares the UK response option ‘should 
be part of the UK’s energy mix’ to the US response options ‘support’ and ‘strongly support’ (pooled together); UK response option ‘should NOT 
be part of the UK’s energy mix’ is compared to ‘oppose’ and ‘strongly oppose’ (pooled) 
NB: ‘don’t know’ and ‘neither support nor oppose’ responses are not included for significance tests to allow for comparability across samples
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Figure 2. Support for domestic use of various energy sources.
The largest differences between nations were for
clean energy (43% in the US vs. 25% in the UK asso-
ciated it with shale gas) and cheap energy (55% in
the US vs. 43% in the UK). The percentage of ‘don’t
know’ responses was high in both nations (over 25%
for all six associations) and particularly for association
with higher vs. lower greenhouse gas emissions (over
40% in eachnation). Thismirrors scientific uncertainty
and disagreement over whether UGD will increase or
decrease net carbon emissions (Alvarez et al 2012,
Newell and Raimi 2014).
3.3. Support for other energy sources
Our second research question queried the broader con-
text around the cross-national differences observed in
relation to UGD—are these reflected in support for
and opposition to other energy sources? We asked
whether respondents supported or opposed domestic
production and use of each of eight renewable energy,
fossil fuel, and nuclear energy sources. For the com-
parisons below, we include respondents who answered
the question affirmatively or negatively (i.e. exclud-
ing ‘don’t know’ and ‘neither support nor oppose’
responses to allow for comparison of the differently-
worded questions across the two samples; all responses
are reflected in table S2 in the supplementary informa-
tion, however). Statistically significant differences, via
independent samples t-tests, existed between nations
for seven of the eight energy sources (figure 2). Sup-
port was higher in theUS for five sources. Nevertheless,
high support for all forms of renewable energy listed
(i.e. solar, hydro-electric, wind, and bioenergy) and for
conventional natural gas existed in both nations. More
than 92% of US respondents with positive or negative
views on the energy source in question supported use
of each of these five energy sources, while at least 83%
in the UK supported use of each source.
Of respondents who supported or opposed devel-
opment (not answering ‘don’t know’ [UK survey] or
‘neither support nor oppose’ [US survey]), support
for shale gas as a future national energy source was
higher in the US (68%) than in the UK (58%). In
each case, the percentage of respondents supporting
shale gas for domestic use was substantially lower
than the percentage supporting conventional natural
gas (93% in US; 83% in UK). Support for the other
fossil fuel, coal, was higher than support for shale
gas in the UK; the opposite was true in the US
sample (again, excluding ‘don’t know’ and ‘neither’
responses). Compared to other energy sources, sup-
port for nuclear power was by far the lowest in the US
(45%). Although support was not high in the UK
(66%), the gap between nations was largest for this
energy source.
3.4. Factors affecting support for UGD; cross-
national differences
We ran binary logistic regressions for each nation to
examine the effect of people’s beliefs about potential
impacts, and a range of socio-demographic attributes,
on their support for/opposition to UGD (‘don’t know’
responses were excluded from this analysis) (table
1). We originally included additional descriptive vari-
ables in the regressions (i.e. education level, household
income, political affiliation), but because these vari-
ables were non-significant in each regression, and they
reduced the effective sample size by more than half in
the UK sample (due to non-response on some of the
variables),we removed themfromthefinal analysis.We
also included awareness of shale gas development, but
again this was unimportant in the regressions and we
removed it (see supplemental information for details).
While the Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 values (Nagelk-
erke 1991) for both nations’ models were quite high,
4
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Table 1. Binary logistic regression, support/opposition and associations with shale gas.
United States (n= 546) United Kingdom (n= 1130)
Odds ratio Significance Standard error Odds ratio Significance Standard error
Associated with...
Earthquakes 0.40 .000 0.26 0.28 .000 0.26
Cheap energy 2.16 .005 0.27 2.18 .001 0.23
Water contamination 0.20 .000 0.32 0.20 .000 0.28
Clean energy 2.16 .010 0.30 2.94 .000 0.30
Energy security 2.25 .004 0.28 8.27 .000 0.24
Higher GHG emissions 0.31 .000 0.26 0.30 .000 0.26
Socio-demographic attributes
Sex (0=male; 1=female) 0.64 .084 0.26 0.61 .026 0.22
Age 1.00 .581 0.00 1.00 .634 0.01
Nagelkerke R2: 0.54 (United States) 0.75 (United Kingdom)
Cox and Snell R2: 0.38 (United States) 0.56 (United Kingdom)
NB: The dependent variable is coded as 1 = extracting natural gas from shale in [UK or US] should be allowed, 0 = should NOT be allowed;
bold odds ratios denote significant parameter estimates (p< 0.05).
the UKR2 (i.e. percent variation in the dependent vari-
able explained by the set of independent variables)
was substantially higher (0.75 for UK; 0.54 for US).
Much research on public perceptions of UGD in the
US has asserted that beliefs about impacts are key cor-
relates of support/opposition (Jacquet and Stedman
2013, Theodori 2013, Evensen and Stedman 2017b);
our data suggest that this is true to an even greater
extent in the UK.
All odds ratios for the associations were in the
intuitive directions—beliefs that risks exist were asso-
ciated with opposition; beliefs that benefits exist were
associated with support. Beliefs that water contamina-
tion, higher greenhouse gas emissions, and earthquakes
will occur link with more opposition. In contrast, if
one associates development with cheap energy, clean
energy, or energy security, one ismore likely to support
development. The degree to which beliefs about cheap
energy, water contamination, and higher greenhouse
gas emissions are associated with support for UGD is
remarkably similar across the nations (as measured by
the odds ratios).
A substantial cross-national difference emerges in
the extent towhichassociationwith energy security cor-
relates with support; UK respondents who associated
UGD with energy security were 8.3 times more likely
to support development than UK respondents who did
not make this association (the odds ratio in the US
was only 2.3). A logistic regression for the UK sam-
ple with support/opposition as the dependent variable
and association with energy security as the sole inde-
pendent variable generated a Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 of
0.52, meaning that this association alone could explain
over half of the variation in support for and opposition
to development.
4. Discussion and communication
implications
Shale gas received the least support in the UK of any
of the eight energy sources considered in our survey.
Even coal, widely recognised as more polluting, more
detrimental for climate change, andmore liable to cause
human health problems (Duggan-Haas et al 2013),
received greater support. This could owe, in part, to the
UK having much more historical experience with coal
extraction than with onshore gas development—coal
is a known entity (Gunzburger et al 2017). Neverthe-
less, support for shale gas contributing to the future
energymix in bothnations outstrippedopposition, and
more respondents in both nations supported domestic
production and use than opposed it.
In both nations, the opposition that exists to
UGD seems to have little to do with the gas aspect,
as support for conventional natural gas use paral-
lels levels for renewable energy sources. This has
considerable implications for communication and
policy on this issue, especially in light of the UK
government’s announcement in November 2015—
and renewed commitment under Prime Minister
TheresaMay’s currentGovernment—ofbringingmore
gas-fired electricity generating plants online to replace
coal-fired plants—all of which are slated to be retired
by 2025. Focusing on differences (or lack thereof)
between unconventional and conventional develop-
ment in mass media and political discourse could
strongly shape policy conversations and public per-
ceptions. The UK Government, industry, and other
entities supporting UGD would likely see this as an
opportunity to highlight similarities between UGD
and conventional development (e.g. that which has
occurred in the North Sea for decades), while oppo-
nents such as community ‘frack free’ organisations
and environmental non-governmental organisations
would seek to emphasise the differences. Our rec-
ommendation is that any party interested in fostering
informed decision-making clearly explicate, in accessi-
ble language, the similarities and differences between
conventional and unconventional development in
terms of both the techniques employed and the
potential impacts on environment, economy, and
social life.
The cross-national differences in beliefs about
impacts highlight that the ‘cheap and clean’ depic-
tion of UGD conveyed in the US has clearly not been
5
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accepted to the same extent in the UK. Discourse and
massmedia coverageonUGDin theUS is decentralised
and regional, varying fromstate to state (Ashmoore et al
2016), whereas national media coverage is the primary
means of information sharing in the UK (Bomberg
2015, Cotton 2015, Williams et al 2017). Coverage
that challenges the ‘cheap and clean’ message would
thus be more diffuse in the US and any exposure to
this message likely would not be evident in a national
sample survey that has little representation of individ-
uals living in the rural areas where development occurs
or is likely to occur (i.e. where regional mass media
coverage on this topic is based). Conversely, the nat-
ural gas industry has engaged in extensive television
advertising in the US, employing the rhetoric of ‘cheap
and clean’. Indeed, previous research has found an
association between obtaining information predomi-
nantly from television and increased support for UGD
(Boudet et al 2014).
The results herein help explain our previously-
reported finding that support is substantially elevated
in the US sample compared to the UK sample (Sted-
man et al 2016). The effect sizes of the binary logistic
regressions showed that a large percentage of the vari-
ance in support and opposition can be explained by
beliefs about a relatively small number of impacts
potentially associated with UGD (six beliefs explain
54% of variance in the US and 75% in the UK).
When excluding ‘don’t know’ responses, the UK sam-
ple perceived, on average, all three negative impacts
to be more likely than the US sample did. Con-
versely, the US sample perceived all three positive
impacts as more likely than the UK sample did. If we
assume that beliefs about impacts precede evaluations
of support and opposition, the cross-national differ-
ences in beliefs about these six impacts can explain the
majority of the difference in support and opposition
cross-nationally.
The substantial percentage of ‘don’t know’
responses to the support/opposition question and
to the six ‘beliefs about impacts’ questions reveals
that there might be a large undecided population
whose views on this topic can be shaped further.
Recent research has shown that additional informa-
tion about impacts of UGD can influentially shape
overall attitudes and beliefs (Whitmarsh et al 2015).
Beliefs about UGD’s effects on water contamination,
energy security, and carbon emissions are all strongly
associated with likelihood of support for UGD; fur-
thermore, over 30% of respondents in each nation
answered ‘don’t know’ as to whether these effects were
associated with UGD or not. Due to the important
connection between beliefs about these issues and sup-
port/opposition, and the amount of indecision about
UGD especially in the UK, communication about
these effects could potentially influence public percep-
tions to a heightened extent in the UK compared to
the US.
5. Policy relevance
In this section, we focus predominantly on policy in the
UK, because the UK Government is currently seeking
to move forward with shale gas extraction (in Eng-
land) and is trying to learn from US experience for the
formation of policy. Her Majesty’s Treasury (2016)
is reviewing evidence from a consultation on how to
approach setting up a shale wealth fund to compen-
sate people in England living near shale developments.
Information is being drawn from the US experience.
We are not aware of any examples of US states or US
regulatory authorities looking to the UK experience to
inform their policy and regulation. This does not mean
that policy developments in the US are not impor-
tant or interesting; we simply feel that UK policy has
much more to learn from a comparison of UK and
US perceptions than US policy has to gain from such
a comparison. The fact that regulation is much less
decentralised in the UK also means that policy direc-
tions can be discussed more clearly and concisely in
that nation (i.e. only the four national governments—
England,Scotland,Wales, andNorthern Ireland—have
jurisdiction over regulation).
In Her Majesty’s Treasury’s (2016) recent con-
sultation on a proposed shale wealth fund, the UK
Government revealed it wants tomake benefits of shale
gas development to local communities more tangi-
ble. While this is certainly one approach to increasing
support for shale gas development (the Government’s
clear goal), the importance of national-level implica-
tions of development (e.g. energy security and carbon
emissions) cannot be neglected. Likewise, our find-
ing that the public attribute as much importance to
beliefs about water contamination in the UK as do the
public in theUS (where this is often reported as the cen-
tral issue affecting support/opposition), reveals thatUK
Government discourse and regulation must not dwell
solely on benefits, but also on proper management and
regulation of risks.
Water contamination due to UGD in the US is not
common, andmost of thewater contamination that has
occurred has been due to surface spills, although some
has arisen through cement well casings that have failed
(Rahm and Riha 2012, Olmstead et al 2013, Vidic et al
2013, Stokstad 2014, Vengosh et al 2014, Llewellyn et al
2015). Therefore, regulation that is designed to prevent
and remediate surface spills and that ensures the best
possiblewell casing standards (which varywidely across
US states’ regulations) would benefit theUK. The pres-
ence and promotion of best practices in theUKwill not
necessarily assuage concerns related to water quality,
but this is clearly an area of concern as in the US, and
explicit focus in regulation andGovernment discussion
of the topic is necessary to respond to public concerns.
In this respect, the British Geological Survey’s baseline
monitoring of water quality at all sites with UGD wells
sited is a good first step.
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In terms of communication from interest groups
opposed to the Government’s current support for
development, these entities (e.g. Friends of the Earth
and ‘Frack Free’ organisations within communities
throughout the UK) have already focused on water
contamination, earthquakes, and their questioning of
the premise that shale gas development benefits carbon
emissions—due to incentivising investment in further
infrastructure that will prolong dependence on fossil
fuels. Our finding on the importance of beliefs about
energy security intimates that these groups also could
benefit from an explicit focus on the energy security
implications of UGD. For example, if UGD is to be
opposed, what other energy sources can be realistically
relied upon to enhance the energy security that clearly
matters to the British public?
In terms of the effect of associating UGD with
higher carbon emissions on support/opposition,Whit-
marsh et al (2015) have independently shown through
an embedded experiment in a survey of UK residents
that providing people with additional information
about the connection between UGD and carbon emis-
sions can change attitudes, particularly for individuals
without firmly held views on whether such a relation-
ship exists.Considering that 42%of survey respondents
in the US and 49% of respondents in the UK reported
that they ‘don’t know’ whether UGD is associated with
higher carbon emissions or not, this could be a fruit-
ful area for further communication in either nation.
While much research has established the connection
between views on climate change and political lean-
ing (i.e. liberals are more likely to attribute climate
change to anthropogenic sources and to be concerned
about it compared to conservatives), no research yet
has examined whether political views affect the extent
towhich an association ismadebetween climate change
and UGD. One might hypothesise that liberals would
associate higher emissions with UGD, while conserva-
tives would associate lower emissions with UGD; this
remains an important area for further inquiry. Nev-
ertheless, the fact that nearly half of all respondents
in both surveys were undecided on this association
indicates that, unlike views on climate change itself,
views on this association between emissions and UGD
might be susceptible to influence through provision of
additional information.
The largest difference between nations, in terms of
factors affecting support and opposition, is the mag-
nitude of influence that beliefs about energy security
exerts upon support for UGD. Whether one associates
developmentwithwater contaminationwas the leading
correlate of (lack of) support forUGD in theUS; energy
security was the strongest correlate of support for UGD
in theUK.Conversations about energy security do exist
in the US (often framed as ‘energy independence’), but
are likely more salient in the UK. This difference in
salience is because the US expects to be a net nat-
ural gas exporter by 2017 (US EIA 2016), while in
2014, imports represented over 60% of total natural
gas supply in the UK (UK Government 2015). Energy
security is also a prominent topic in the UK due to:
(1) concerns over the UK’s declining domestic oil and
gas reserves in the North Sea, (2) the Government’s
proposed closure of all coal-fired power plants by 2025
(ostensibly necessitating more power generation from
natural gas), and (3) concerns about importing gas
originally sourced from Russia (a politically unstable
trade partner, as evidenced byGazprom’s dealings with
Ukraine; Russia supplies Europe with about 30% of
its natural gas). In contrast, the US sources 97% of its
imported natural gas fromCanada (USEIA 2015). This
importance of contextual factors in shaping widely var-
ied views on energy security cross-national has been
highlighted previously (Sovacool and Vivoda 2012,
Knox-Hayes et al 2013, Sovacool 2016), as has the
high level of concern about energy security in the UK
specifically (Demski et al 2014).
Energy security is mentioned frequently in UK
mass media and policy discourse (UKERC 2016) and
PrimeMinister Theresa May and former PrimeMinis-
terDavidCameronhave championedenergy security as
a rationale forpursuingUGD.Thirty-fivepercent of the
UKrespondents ‘don’t know’whether theywould asso-
ciate energy security with UGD or not; their ultimate
determination on that question could substantially
influence whether or not they support theUK engaging
in substantial commercial scaleUGD.The implications
of this fact for communication are clear for individuals
on all ‘sides’ of this issue. Arguments about the ways in
which, and extent to which, domestic unconventional
gas can forward energy security (or not) could prove
pivotal for decreasing equivocation and indecision on
attitudes towards UGD in the UK. The magnitude of
the difference in association between energy security
and support for development between the US and UK
certainly justifies more inquiry on this relationship. In
such future inquiry, numerous operationalisations of
the multi-faceted concept of ‘energy security’ (Sova-
cool et al 2012) would increase understanding of what
exactlymotivates the connection between the variables.
6. Conclusions
The findings presented herein highlight the sim-
ilarities and differences in perceptions of energy
development that can emerge across differing cultural,
governance, and geopolitical contexts. Despite contex-
tual differences, several commonalities were manifest
cross-nationally. Communications designed to target
wide-ranging audiences on this topic could focus on
those commonalities. Even within the US, there is
considerable variation in regulation, mineral rights
ownership, and discourse across states, making this
recommendation equally applicable intra-nationally
within the US. The cross-national differences reported
herein afford government, non-governmental organi-
sations, and industry theopportunity to targetmessages
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about specific impacts and characteristics of UGD to
nationally- or regionally-specific audiences.
Finally, thenotabledifferencesbetweenperceptions
of UGD in UK versus the US, as well as the sim-
ilarities, reveal the need for better understanding of
public perceptions in multiple nations debating UGD.
Such perceptions directly affect the industry’s social
licence to operate (Lloyd et al 2013, Luke et al 2014,
Gunzburger et al 2017, Bradshaw and Waite 2017). A
dearthof social scientific informationexists aboutUGD
cross-nationally, even inmany industrialised nations in
Europe (Lis et al 2015) and in Canada (Thomas et al
2017). Most understanding is limited to findings from
the US, with some attention to the UK, and less to
Canada, the Netherlands, Australia, and sparse studies
in other western nations (e.g. Poland, France (Gun-
zburger et al 2017, Lis and Stankiewicz 2017, Lis and
Stasik 2017)).
The knowledge gap is even more noticeable in
developing nations (e.g. Argentina, Mexico, China,
South Africa) considering or moving forward with
UGD, where no empirical findings on public percep-
tions of unconventional gas development whatsoever
have entered the peer-reviewed research literature.
Our findings of cross-national commonalities sug-
gest that some context-specific data from the US
might apply to these foreign situations (e.g. in relation
to beliefs about water contamination and/or carbon
emissions), but other US findings will be of little
use for understanding perspectives in those nations.
One could easily predict substantial cultural differ-
ences between, for example, developing nations and
the US—which could shape public perceptions. This
discussion highlights the dangers of generalising across
national contexts, and makes the case for increased
understanding in nations where we know little to
nothing. This is perhaps the single greatest current
research need in relation to public perceptions of
UGD.
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